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Local pragmatics redux: Presupposition accommodation without covert operators*

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On several occasions in recent linguistic research, operations that used to be considered part of pragmatics were syntacticized: a covert operator was postulated to enrich the meaning of some constituents as part of compositional semantics. Two cases in point are Chierchia, Fox and Spector's exhaustivity operator O, used to compute local implicatures, and Bochvar's assertion operator A, used to compute local accommodation of presuppositions. A key benefit of syntacticization is to explain why these operations can be performed in the scope of various operators, something that is not easy to conceptualize within standard Gricean pragmatics. But are these operators syntactically real? We offer a case study of the operator A. Using tests based on ellipsis, we argue that it is not syntactically real. We develop an alternative analysis of presupposition accommodation in the spirit of Recanati's `free enrichment'. It is based on generalized contextual restrictions, which we take to apply to all predicative elements. Besides this result, our analysis raises a more general question: Which pragmatic operators are syntactically real and which are not?

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1 Pragmatic operations and covert operators

On several occasions in recent linguistic research, operations that used to be considered part of pragmatics were syntacticized: a covert operator was postulated to enrich the meaning of some constituents as part of compositional semantics. A key benefit of syntacticization is to explain why these operations can in some cases be performed in the scope of various operators, something that is not easy to conceptualize within standard Gricean pragmatics. But are these operators syntactically real?

We develop tests based on ellipsis and argue that the answer is negative in one important case study: local presupposition accommodation, syntacticized by way of Bochvar's assertion operator A, which turns undefinedness into falsity (Beaver 2001, Beaver and Krahmer 2001, Fox 2013). We argue that local accommodation can be analyzed as a variety of local pragmatic enrichment, a view proposed for different cases by Recanati (2003). Specifically, we take as our model contextual restrictions, used by Recanati (2010) to explain why *it rains* can in context be interpreted as *it rains in Paris*. We generalize these restrictions to all predicative elements: under some pragmatic conditions, *stopped smoking* could come to mean *belongs to a salient domain G and stopped smoking*. This provides an analysis of presupposition accommodation without operators.

Similar questions about syntactic reality could be asked about the exhaustification operator O, postulated in research on local implicatures (Chierchia 2004, Chierchia et al. 2012). We do not discuss O in the present study, except to motivate the notion of local pragmatic enrichment; this operator is discussed more thoroughly in Chatain and Schlenker (2025a). Likewise, we do not discuss the more recent non-redundancy operator R, postulated by Blumberg and Goldstein (2020); see Chatain and Schlenker (2025b).

1.1 Syntactic operators vs. local pragmatic enrichment

Famously, Chierchia (2004) argued that some scalar implicatures are computed locally, in the scope of various logical operators.[1] This finding was unexpected in view of the neo-Gricean view, on which a sentence S triggers the implicature that an alternative S' is false if S' is more informative and hence asserting S' is more cooperative than asserting S—something that does not make sense for non-sentential constituents (e.g. Horn 1972). Chierchia (2004) originally revised the interpretive procedure so as to allow scalar implicatures to be computed in tandem with compositional interpretation. Soon after, however, the same facts were handled instead by postulating a covert operator O, which as a first approximation is a presupposition-less (and covert) version of *only*

[1] Landman (2000) and Schwarz (2001) independently explored related ideas.

(e.g. Chierchia et al. 2012). To illustrate, (1a) is now routinely analyzed as (1b), where O appears within the first disjunct and strengthens it to mean: *Ann only read some of the books*. (The motivation lies in a constraint, called Hurford's constraint, which prohibits the second disjunct from entailing the first; with O, the constraint is satisfied.)

(1) a. Ann read some of the books or she read all the books.
b. O [Ann read some of the books] or she read all of the books.

Recanati (2010) proposes that local implicatures are neither syntactic nor semantic in nature, but fall under a more general category of *modulation*, a process whereby semantic values are modulated before they enter compositional evaluation. Modulation can turn the "animal" meaning of *lion* in (2a) into a "statue" meaning. Similarly, it can turn the literal meanings of *city* and *asleep* in (2b) into extended or metaphorical ones: since a set of buildings cannot be asleep, either *city* must come to refer to its inhabitants, or *asleep* must come to mean something like *quiet and showing little activity*.

(2) (Recanati 2010: pp. 5 and 41)

a. There is a lion in the middle of the piazza.
b. The city is asleep.

Recanati (2010) proposes that local implicatures are a subcase of modulation called *free enrichment*, a process whereby an expression "is contextually given a more specific interpretation than it literally encodes" (p. 168). The architecture Recanati proposes is somewhat reminiscent of Chierchia (2004)'s initial analysis of locally computed implicatures, with modulation affecting meanings before they enter semantic composition.

As we will see, a similar debate arises about the syntactic reality of the local accommodation operator, and we will argue for a version of Recanati's modulation view.

1.2 The local accommodation operator A

In a landmark study of presupposition projection, Heim (1983) distinguished between two repair strategies that might be invoked when a presupposition fails to be satisfied, as in (3). (We replace *France* with *Syldavia* in Heim's example to reduce the chance that readers have prior beliefs about the country's constitutional system.)

(3) The king of Syldavia did not come.

One strategy, global accommodation, might just follow from Gricean pragmatics: the addressee computes the presupposition as required by projection rules, sees that in view of her beliefs the sentence should give rise to a failure, and adapts her beliefs to avoid this unfortunate outcome. Concretely, Heim's dynamic semantics was based on

update rules such as (4), which specify how the context of evaluation of an expression is updated in view of the semantic value of its constituent parts. For atomic elements, one can take for granted a static trivalent semantics, writing $\mathbf{p}(w)$ for the value of a propositional expression p at world w, and state how failure at a world determines presupposition failure in a context, as in (4a). Rules such as (4c) further specify how the update of a complex expression is determined on the basis of the update of its parts.

(4) a. If p is an atomic propositional expression and F is a (possibly complex) propositional expression:
b. $C[p] = \#$ iff for some $w \in C$, $\mathbf{p}(w) = \#$. If $C[p] \neq \#$, $C[p] = \{w \in C : \mathbf{p}(w) = 1\}$.
c. $C[\text{not } F] = \#$ iff $C[F] = \#$; if $C[F] \neq \#$, $C[\text{not } F] = C - C[F]$.

Applying (4) to (3) and assuming (5d) for the static semantics of *the king of Syldavia came*, we obtain the condition that C should guarantee the existence of a king of Syldavia. The addressee sees that this condition is not satisfied by C and adjusts her beliefs to ensure that it is satisfied in a more restrictive context C^+ that entails that Syldavia has a king. The update operation applies to that strengthened context, as illustrated in (5a). If C^+ is the minimal strengthening of C that satisfies the presupposition, it has the value in (5b), and after global accommodation and update, it follows that Syldavia is a monarchy, as shown in (5c).

(5) a. C[not the king of Syldavia came]
$\xrightarrow{\text{global accommodation}}$
C^+[not the king of Syldavia came] = $C^+ - C^+$[the king of Syldavia came].
b. $C^+ = C$[Syldavia has a king].
c. Result of global accommodation:
C[Syldavia has a king] $- C$[Syldavia has a king][the king of Syldavia came] = $\{w \in C$: in w, Syldavia has a king and the king of Syldavia came$\}$.
d. Static trivalent semantics: for any world w, **the king of Syldavia came**$(w) = \#$ unless there is a unique king of Syldavia in w. If it is not #, it is 1 iff the king of Syldavia came in w.

This monarchist conclusion might be hard to swallow if one is talking about France rather than Syldavia—or if one believes that Syldavia is a republic. But fortunately, Heim offers an alternative, local accommodation, which does not affect the global context of evaluation (that of the entire negative sentence) but just the immediate context of the trigger (that is, the local context of the clause *the king of France came*). This gives rise to the result in (6a), where local accommodation and update combined do not entail that France has a king. The sentence then means in essence: *It is not the case that France has a king and that he came*, where the underlined conjunct is the contribution of

local accommodation. Local accommodation is usually assumed to be a last resort that is only employed in case global accommodation leads to unacceptable results.

(6) a. C[not the king of France came]
$\xrightarrow{\text{local accommodation}}$
$C - C^{+}$[the king of France came].

b. $C^{+} = C$[France has a king].

c. Result of local accommodation:
$C - C$[France has a king][the king of France came]
$= \{w \in C : \text{in } w, \text{ it is not the case that France has a king and he came}\}$.

While non-committal about the implementation, Heim seemed to view local and global accommodation alike as pragmatic in nature. Clearly, however, local accommodation is not an operation that invariably strengthens the meaning of the target sentence. Without local accommodation, if (3) is true, then Syldavia has a king, but this entailment disappears when local accommodation is applied. This suggests, rather unsurprisingly, that local accommodation is not a Gricean-style operation that enriches the global meaning. The analysis that we present in Section 5 can be seen as a way to formalize the idea that pragmatics may introduce new meanings in local positions.

It was later proposed that local accommodation could be viewed in terms of the optional insertion of an operator that turns undefinedness, notated as #, into falsity, notated as 0 (Beaver 2001). This operator corresponds to Bochvar (1939)'s meta-assertion operation and is accordingly notated as A. In Beaver's words, "the meta-assertion of F, AF, is the proposition that F is true"[2], and it can be defined as in (7). This operator can be applied to a variety of trivalent logics, including the trivalent core of Heim's dynamic semantics.

(7) AF has the value 1 iff F has the value 1; otherwise, AF has the value 0.

On this operator-based view, local accommodation is just the insertion of A above an elementary propositional expression. This can be applied in Heim's framework, with the logical form in (8a) and the result in (8b), which is equivalent in this case to Heim's original recipe. (Importantly, there are non-dynamic trivalent accounts of presupposition projection, and those may borrow Bochvar's A without making use of Heim's intrinsically dynamic operation.[3])

[2] Beaver (2001: p. 37). We replaced Φ with F in the quote.

[3] For static trivalent accounts of presupposition projection, see for instance Karttunen and Peters (1979), Krahmer (1998), Fox (2008), and George (2014).

(8) a. not A[the king of France came]
b. If $C \neq \#$, then C[not A[the king of France came]] $\neq \#$,
and C[not A[the king of France came]] = $C - C[A$[the king of France came]]
= $\{w \in C$: in w, it is not the case that France has a king and he came$\}$.
c. **A**[**the king of Syldavia came**](w) = 1 iff in w there is a unique king of Syldavia and he came; = 0 otherwise.

Our main argument against this operator will be that when ellipsis tests are applied it becomes very dubious that A is syntactically real. We present cases like (9) where two clauses are parallel for the purpose of ellipsis, even when one receives a locally accommodated reading and the other one does not.

(9) *Context:* We're supposed to take the lab rat out of its cage once a day. Otherwise, it feels stressed. Bill has been unreliable in performing this task.
Ann: Last Monday, Bill did not take the lab rat out of its cage.
(⇝ last Monday, the rat was initially in its cage)
Sue: On Wednesday as well, but that's just because I took it home on Tuesday and forgot to bring it back, so it wasn't in the cage at all that day.

1.3 Data elicitation

Unless they are cited from the literature, the examples we discuss are original to this piece. English judgments come from extended one-on-one elicitation sessions with two native speakers of American English, who are also linguists. (We reasoned that seasoned linguists would be more apt to judge some of the more difficult cases we discuss; for arguments in favor of this introspective method, see Sprouse and Almeida (2012, 2013) and Sprouse et al. (2013)). The French data come from the authors' own judgments.

1.4 Structure

The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we sketch a typology of different types of truth-conditional enrichments, some of which are "seen" by ellipsis and some of which are not; in particular, we study the case of domain restrictions. We turn to the local accommodation of presuppositions in Section 3, where we lay out two arguments against A, one based on ellipsis and a semantic argument developing an argument by Romoli (2011). In Section 4, we turn to two potential objections against our argument. Section 5 presents our analysis of local accommodation implementing the idea of Free Enrichment. Finally, we draw some conclusions in Section 4.2.4.

2 Ellipsis and the typology of truth-conditional enrichments

We start by analyzing examples in which ellipsis interacts with various enrichments depending on their source: a covert syntactic operator, a semantic rule, or a post-semantic enrichment. These examples lay the groundwork for our argument against the accommodation operator.

2.1 Parallelism requirements on ellipsis resolution

Ellipsis is subject to licensing conditions. It is commonly accepted that these include at the very least parallelism requirements—the elided site must, in some fashion, be parallel to its antecedent. Theories differ on the nature of the parallelism requirement. Depending on the approach, parallelism may be a parallelism of forms (*syntactic parallelism*), of meanings (*semantic parallelism*), or of both. Syntactic parallelism requires the elided constituent and its antecedent to be identical. Semantic parallelism, in a formulation that goes back to Rooth (1992a), requires that the antecedent clause be among the focus value of the clause that contains the elided constituent, as shown in (11) for the sentence in (10).

(10) 5 is less than or equal to itself, and 7_F is <~~less than or equal to itself~~> as well. (Rooth 1992b: example (5))

(11) **Semantic parallelism requirement.**
5 ≤ 5 must belong to $\{1 \leq 1, \ldots, \mathbf{5 \leq 5}, \ldots, 7 \leq 7, \ldots\}$.

Rooth (1992a) proposes that ellipsis is subject to *both* syntactic and semantic parallelism conditions. The ellipsis in (10) meets the syntactic parallelism condition, because the elided VP is syntactically identical to its antecedent. The two clauses also satisfy a form of semantic parallelism, spelled out in terms of focus values: the proposition expressed by the antecedent must belong to the focus value of the clause that contains the ellipsis site. Specifically, the antecedent expresses $5 \leq 5$, which is in the set of propositions $\{n \leq n\}$, that is, the focus value of the second clause. Together, these two parallelisms license the ellipsis displayed in (10).

To justify this dual syntactic and semantic requirement, Rooth offers an interesting contrast between ellipsis and downstressing. According to Rooth, downstressing only requires semantic parallelism in order to be licensed. In (12b), the focus value of the downstressed clause (represented in subscripted font) is the set of propositions $\{n \leq n\}$, which contains the proposition expressed by the first clause; this mere semantic parallelism suffices to license downstressing. By contrast, ellipsis is more demanding, and as a result *less than or equal to itself* in (12a) cannot be elided: while this

phrase satisfies the semantic parallelism condition, it is not syntactically parallel to its antecedent. The only reading of *6 isn't <>* in that context is one where *less than or equal to 5* is elided (making it a true statement).

(12) Logical Forms and semantic parallelism condition

a. *5 is less than or equal to 5, and 6 is <~~less than or equal to itself~~> as well.[4]
b. 5 is less than or equal to 5, and 6 is $_{\text{less than or equal to itself}}$ as well.
c. **Semantic parallelism requirement.**
5 ≤ 5 must belong to {**1 ≤ 1**, . . . , **5 ≤ 5**, . . . , **7 ≤ 7**, . . .}.

2.2 Two types of explanations and their interaction with ellipsis

When an expression *E* receives a stronger interpretation than expected by a simple-minded compositional semantics, this enriched semantics may be explained in different ways, and each explanation interacts differently with ellipsis.

A *syntactic* explanation attributes the unexpected meaning of *E* to the presence of a covert operator *Op*. The semantic value of *Op* may in turn depend on parameters of the interpretation function (a contextual operator) or not (a non-contextual operator). The dependence on contextual parameters matters to ellipsis because of bound-variable readings. When an operator is sensitive to some parameters of interpretation, it may in principle be "bound" and may thus yield bound-variable readings, on which the interpretation of the elided clause is parallel to that of the antecedent clause *modulo* the interpretation of the parameters, as illustrated in (13a) with the context-dependent expression *local*. We refer to this as *functional semantic parallelism*: in the simplified analysis in (13b) (disregarding tense), the predicates *go to the local^x bar* are identical only up to the value of the binder *x*.

(13) a. Jane went to the local bar. And Bill did <~~go to the local bar [= his local bar]~~> too.
b. $\lambda x.\, t_x$ go to the local^x bar. And Bill <~~$\lambda x.\, t_x$ go to the local^x bar~~> too.

[4] It could be argued that in Rooth's example, the semantic parallelism constraint arises entirely from the semantics of *as well*, and not from downstressing or ellipsis. For presumably independent reasons, *as well* cannot be felicitously omitted in this example, preventing us from disentangling the contribution of phonological reduction from the contribution of *as well*. By contrast, negative versions of the examples allow one to omit *as well*: *5 is less or equal than 5 and 7 isn't* $_{\text{less or equal to itself}}$. The resulting sentences are mathematically false, however. Even so, it should be possible to pass judgments on the acceptability of the pattern of accenting on a false sentence. Ultimately, the key point for our argument is not where the semantic parallelism constraint comes from, but rather the existence of a syntactic parallelism constraint that is specific to ellipsis. The positive examples suffice to establish this claim.

The operator A, the focus of this piece, has an entirely non-contextual semantics: regardless of context, A invariably converts undefinedness to falsity. So it does not give rise to this sort of functional semantic parallelism.

The second possible analysis of an enrichment is the *contextual* analysis. It assumes no covert operator in the target expression *E*, but makes the interpretation itself depend on more contextual parameters than meet the eye; the unexpected meaning only arises in special circumstances, when the contextual parameters are set in a certain way. Since these contextual parameters responsible for the enrichment may be bound, bound-variable readings are expected and functional semantic parallelism may be expected. We will illustrate this below with the case of domain restriction.

Syntactic analyses and contextual analyses are schematically illustrated in (14). They are sometimes hard to tease apart empirically. In fact, any semantic rule of composition may often be reified into an operator in the syntax. For instance, Charlow (2017) shows how the lambda-abstraction rule, typically thought to be a rule of composition, can be rewritten as a syntactic operator. For this reason, the present paper's argument against the local accommodation operator A is not an argument against any syntactic approach to local accommodation: it can only be an argument against the specific approach based on A. For clarity, we distinguish below between context-sensitive and non-context-sensitive versions of syntactic enrichment, with the disclaimer that our analysis solely targets the *non*-context-sensitive version.

(14) **Two analyses of local enrichment**

a. **Syntactic enrichment** (in two versions: non-context-sensitive *Op* and context-sensitive *Op*)
Syntactic form: Op *E*
Source of the enrichment: for some parameter p, $[\![\text{Op } E]\!]^p$ differs in meaning from $[\![E]\!]^p$.

b. **Contextual enrichment**
Syntactic form: *E*
Source of the enrichment: for some parameters p, p', $[\![E]\!]^{p'}$ differs in meaning from $[\![E]\!]^p$.

With these types of analysis in mind, we consider contexts in which *E* serves as the antecedent for an elided expression E'. We determine whether E' must receive an enriched meaning when *E* does. This critically depends on which of the explanations laid out above is correct. Importantly, these hypotheses about the origin of the enriched meaning come with different requirements for the semantic and especially syntactic parallelism conditions, as summarized in **Table 1**; the shaded row will be the crucial one

for our argument. The last column, pertaining to *post-semantic enrichment*, concerns another theoretical possibility, which is discussed in Appendix A but will otherwise be disregarded in this article.

	Syntactic		**Contextual enrichment**	**Post-semantic enrichment**
	Non-context-sensitive Op	**Context-sensitive Op**		
Syntactic form	Op *E*	Op *E*	*E*	*E*
Semantics + pragmatics	Non-contextual: **Op E** depends only on **E**.	Contextual: **Op E** depends on interpretation parameters.	Contextual: **E** depends on interpretation parameters.	Non-contextual semantics with pragmatic enrichment of **E**.
Syntactic parallelism	*X* Op *E*. Y_F < Op *E* > .	*X* Op *E*. Y_F < Op *E* > .	*X E*. Y_F < *E* > .	*X E*. Y_F < *E* > .
Semantic parallelism	**X Op E** is in the focus value of Y_F Op *E*.	**X Op E** is in the focus value of Y_F Op *E*.	**X E** is in the focus value of Y_F *E*.	**X E** is in the focus value of Y_F *E*.
Semantic result	Strict semantic parallelism.	Functional semantic parallelism (parallelism modulo contextual parameters).	Functional semantic parallelism (parallelism modulo contextual parameters).	No requirement of pragmatic parallelism.

Table 1: Interaction between two analyses of local enrichment and ellipsis.

The denotation of A does not depend on the value of any contextual parameters (it only turns undefinedness to false); per the chart above, it thus requires strict semantic parallelism. Given this, our main argument takes the following form:

1. Postulating a covert operator A predicts a form of parallelism that is not observed;
2. by contrast, an operator-free analysis using a contextual semantics makes the correct syntactic and semantic predictions.[5]

[5] One could raise the following objection to this argument: in some cases, such as "sprouting," the parallelism requirements are a bit looser than strict identity. One may worry that such "looser" requirements might license ellipsis when *E* contains a covert operator that *E′* does not. This would make the ellipsis test uninformative. We discuss and dismiss this possibility in Appendix B.

The rest of this section illustrates with non-presuppositional phenomena the first and third columns of **Table 1**, pertaining to syntactic enrichment with a non-contextual operator and contextual enrichment. These are the two crucial cases for our discussion, since syntactic enrichment is the theory of local accommodation we will refute, while contextual enrichment is the alternative theory we will advocate for.

2.3 Non-context-sensitive syntactic enrichments

We start with cases in which an enrichment is due to the presence of a covert operator whose meaning does not depend on parameters of the context. We will henceforth call them *syntactic enrichments* (with the understanding that those we consider are not context-sensitive). Syntactic enrichments must obey both the syntactic and the semantic parallelism requirements on ellipsis. This implies that an elided phrase must have an enriched meaning if its antecedent does. We illustrate this fact with two examples.

Existential closure. It has been argued that in many languages, tense is ambiguous, with both an anaphoric and an existential reading (e.g. Grønn and von Stechow (2016)). A case in point is the French *passé composé*, which can carry the roles of both the English present perfect and the English simple past. In (15), the tense of the main clause may either be anaphoric to the tense of the relative clause or understood existentially. The two readings can be represented in simplified form in (16a) and (16b), where we assume that existential quantifiers are dynamic, i.e. can bind variables outside their c-command domain. The key difference is that in (16b) the main clause contains an existential quantifier that is missing from (16a).

(15) *Dans chaque ville que j'ai visitée, des balcons se sont effondrés.*
in each city that I.have visited some balconies SE are collapsed
'In every city I visited, balconies collapsed.'

a. **Anaphoric reading:** *... collapsed during my visit.*
b. **Existential reading:** *... collapsed at some point in the past.*

(16) a. [every x : city(x) & [$\exists t$: $PAST(t)$] I visit$_t$(x)] balconies collapse$_t$.
b. [every x : city(x) & [$\exists t$: $PAST(t)$] I visit$_t$(x)] [$\exists t'$: $PAST(t')$] balconies collapse$_{t'}$.

While unpronounced, existential closure is often thought to be syntactically real and to involve covert quantifiers. The existential reading can thus be seen as a syntactic enrichment, and we expect that this enrichment will be copied by ellipsis. This is indeed the case: in the dialogue in (17), either both clauses yield an anaphoric reading or both yield an existential reading; mixing readings is not possible.

(17) *A: Moi, dans chaque ville que j'ai visitée, des balcons se sont*
A: Me in each city that I.have visited some balconies SE are
effondrés.
collapsed
'In my case, in every city I visited, balconies collapsed.'
B: Moi aussi!
B: Me too
'In my case too!'

Generic and episodic indefinites. A related case is that of episodic/generic indefinites. In English, the same expression *a house in Beverly Hills* can be interpreted generically (as *all typical houses in Beverly Hills*) or episodically (as *there is a house in Beverly Hills such that …*), as illustrated in (18). It is generally thought that the generic reading obtains through a covert GEN operator, which occurs in the generic but not in the episodic case, as seen in (19).

(18) a. Joshua thinks a house in Beverly Hills is huge. (generic)
b. Joshua thinks a house in Beverly Hills underwent an inspection. (episodic)

(19) a. Joshua thinks Gen_x[a house in Beverly Hills]$_x$ is huge.
b. Joshua thinks that a house in Beverly Hills underwent an inspection.

In (18), predicate choice and plausibility considerations disambiguate the reading of the generic. But in other cases, such as (20), a genuine ambiguity is obtained, which can be lifted by adding information to the discourse.

(20) a. Joshua thinks a house in Beverly Hills costs more than $100 million, so in his estimation, the whole neighborhood has a value of at least $50 billion. (generic)
b. Joshua thinks a house in Beverly Hills costs more than $100 million, so his goal in life is to buy it. (episodic)

Because the choice of generic versus episodic reading is conditioned by the presence of a covert operator GEN, it is predicted that an elided clause should be disambiguated in the same way as its antecedent. This is indeed what is found: forcing the disambiguation of the elided clause in favor of the episodic reading (= (21a)) or the generic reading (= (21b)) concomitantly imposes the same reading on the antecedent clause.[6]

[6] A reviewer worries that the unavailability of the reading of (21) on which Joshua believes a generic statement and Mark an episodic one may not be due to parallelism requirements, but simply to the difficulty of conceiving a question under discussion that would make such a mixed reading relevant. To alleviate this concern, we propose the following context

(21) Joshua thinks a house in Beverly Hills costs more than $100 million.

a. Mark does too and he hopes to buy it.
b. Mark does too, so, according to his estimation, the whole neighborhood has a value of at least $50 billion.

2.4 Contextual enrichments

We turn to another way in which enriched meanings can arise: through a dependency on contextual parameters. Sometimes, a constituent receives different meanings depending on the value of some contextual parameters. We use implicit domain restrictions as a prime illustration of this type of enrichment.

A commonplace observation is that a naive semantics for (22) would require that all students in the world come to my office—an undesirable result. To avoid this consequence, one usually assumes that quantifiers are implicitly dependent on a contextually provided domain.

(22) Every student came to my office.

As has been noted by several authors (e.g. von Fintel 1994; Stanley and Gendler Szabó 2000; Schlenker 2006), this contextually provided implicit domain may be functional and co-vary with an arbitrarily large number of variables. Thus in (23), the implicit domain restriction for *part-time instructor* is dependent on the *dean* (different deans interact with different instructors), and the domain restriction for *most students* depends on both the *dean* and the *part-time instructor*.

(23) [Uttered in Los Angeles, a large city with many colleges and many part-time instructors]
Each dean forced each part-time instructor to give an A to most students. (Schlenker 2006)

The possibility of implicit and potentially functional domains has important repercussions on ellipsis and parallelism conditions. Consider the two sentences in (24a), which intuitively make claims about two different sets of professors.

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for (21): Joshua has a budget of 80 million dollars and Mark a budget of 150 million dollars; both have been wondering whether it would be possible to buy a house in Beverly Hills. The question under discussion would be: Does each of them think it will be possible to buy a house in this neighborhood? In this context, the generic statement "Joshua thinks a house in Beverly Hills in general costs 100 million dollars" is the only relevant statement, since it makes it impossible for him to accomplish his goal. For Mark, both episodic and generic statements are relevant and both could reasonably be used. A mixed construal could therefore reasonably be intended in this case. But it is unavailable, as expected because of the parallelism requirement on ellipsis.

(24) a. MIT's dean met with every professor. Harvard's dean didn't.
b. **Simple parse:**
MIT's dean met with every$_C$ professor. not Harvard's dean <~~met with every$_C$ professor~~>.
c. **Functional parse:**
MIT's dean $\lambda x.x$ met with every$_{C(x)}$ professor.
not Harvard's dean <~~$\lambda x.x$ met with every$_{C(x)}$ professor~~> either.

Parsed with a single domain variable C, as in (24b), the two sentences are syntactically identical. But to derive the intended reading, the value given to the domain-restriction variable C must vary across the two clauses (presumably through context change), yielding a violation of the semantic parallelism condition. The problem is solved with the functional parse in (24c), which satisfies both syntactic and semantic parallelism (for the latter, because the same function is defined by the two complex predicates). Assuming that the value of C is constant across the discourse, in (24c) the two clauses are both syntactically identical and semantically parallel. Ellipsis is thus predicted to be licensed. And because the λ-abstract takes different arguments, a different implicit restriction is obtained in the two clauses.

3 Empirical evidence against the existence of the A operator

In this section, we provide two arguments against the existence of the A operator. Our first and main argument is that local accommodation is not subject to the parallelism requirement on ellipsis; this is unexpected under the operator theory of local accommodation. This argument is a general syntactic test applicable to other syntactic operators (as done in Chatain and Schlenker (2025a) for the O operator and in Chatain and Schlenker (2025b) for the R operator). Our second argument specifically targets the semantics traditionally assumed for such an operator. It is a refined version of an argument made by Romoli (2011): in a nutshell, the all-or-nothing semantics for A cannot explain cases of partial accommodation where only one of multiple presuppositions is accommodated.

3.1 Local accommodation obviates strict parallelism requirements

For our first argument, we start by exhibiting cases in which a certain VP triggers a presupposition that projects, while its elided counterpart leads to local accommodation of the same presupposition. Writing X and Y for the subjects, the target discourse will have the form in (25a), where the elided XP is enclosed within angled brackets, and where local accommodation is forced by a *because*-clause stating that subject Y does not satisfy the presupposition P.

(25) a. *X* not $\underline{P}P'$. *Y* too <~~not~~ $\underline{P}P'$> (because not *YP*).
b. **Impossible logical form:**
X not $\underline{P}P'$. *Y* too <~~not~~ **A** $\underline{P}P'$>.

The key will be that if local accommodation were effected by the operator A, A would have to be within the syntactic scope of negation. We ensure that negation is within the elided constituent, with the result that A would have to be as well. Since the logical form in (25b) violates the parallelism condition, we would thus expect, contrary to fact, that A is present in the antecedent.

To get the elided constituent to contain negation, we first use stripping (Hankamer 1971), which unlike VP-ellipsis can elide a matrix negation (a more complex example that relies only on VP-ellipsis is given in Appendix C). The English example in (26) has precisely the structure in (25a), and seems felicitous; it makes use of the verb phrase *take Y out of X*, which presupposes that *Y was in X*. Importantly, the first sentence, pronounced by Ann, is interpreted without local accommodation: Our consultants infer[7] from the first sentence that the rat was in its cage last Monday, suggesting presupposition projection from under negation. This still allows for the application of local accommodation in the elided structure pronounced by Sue.

(26) *Context:* We're supposed to take the lab rat out of its cage once a day. Otherwise, it feels stressed. Bill has been unreliable in performing this task.
Ann: Last Monday, Bill did not take the lab rat out of its cage.
(⇝ last Monday, the rat was initially in its cage)
Sue: On Wednesday as well, but that's just because I took it home on Tuesday and forgot to bring it back, so it wasn't in the cage at all that day.

The French example in (27a) is similar to the English example in (26), but it has the advantage of allowing for a control: it contrasts the negation of the factive verb *s'apercevoir* (in (27a)) with a version of "be unaware" (*ignorer*), in (27b), that expresses the meaning of negation but does not contain a negation, not even as a morpheme.[8] The latter results in incoherence because, for lack of a negation, global and local accommodation alike yield the inference that the students at the private school have real chances of success.

[7] They were asked whether they would conclude from hearing the sentence that the rat was inside the cage on Monday.
[8] One might try to construct a related control in English with *are oblivious of the fact that*, but it would involve a more complicated structure.

(27) *Context:* The speaker works at two separate schools to prepare students for competitive exams. One school is public and has excellent students, but they lack self-confidence. The other school is private and has terrible students.

a. *Au lycée public, les élèves ne s'aperçoivent pas qu'ils*
at.the high.school public the students NE SE-notice not that-they
ont de réelles chances de succès aux examens.
have of real chances of success at.the exams
[OK with continuation in (27c)] 'At the public school, the students do not realize that they have real chances of success at the exams.'

b. *Au lycée public, les élèves ignorent qu'ils ont de*
at.the high.school public the students are.unaware that-they have of
réelles chances de succès aux examens.
real chances of success at.the exams
[# with continuation in (27c)] 'At the public school, the students are unaware that they have real chances of success at the exams.'

c. **Continuation (for both (27a) and (27b)):**
Au lycée privé aussi – mais là c'est parce qu'ils n'en
at.the high.school private too – but there it-is because they NE
ont aucune.
EN have
'At the private school too – but there that's because they don't stand a chance.'

Finally, similar examples can be constructed with many different presupposition triggers, as in (28).

(28) a. "The *P*" presupposes that there is a *P*.
In the accounting division, no employee broke their work computer this year. In the logistics division too, but that's because no one is given a work computer there.
⇒ In the accounting division, everyone has a work computer.

b. "Forget to *p*" presupposes that "*X* was supposed to *p*."
Last month, Bill never forgot to do the dishes. And this month too, since Mary was in charge of this month's dishes.
⇒ Last month, Bill was in charge of doing the dishes.

c. "A and B were on the same plane" presupposes that "A was on a plane."
Last time my partner and I went to Berlin, we weren't on the same plane. This time too, for the simple reason that I wasn't on a plane at all: I took the train.
⇒ Last time, I was on a plane.

In conclusion, local accommodation is not subject to parallelism requirements on ellipsis.[9] As explained above, this is incompatible with the view that it is based on an operator.

3.2 Local accommodation isn't all-or-nothing

We now turn to our second argument, based on Romoli (2011). This argument targets specifically the traditional semantics of the A operator as in Bochvar. Romoli argued that such semantics predicts that accommodation of the presuppositions of a given constituent *X* should be all-or-nothing: either all presuppositions are accommodated or none of them are. In actual facts, this is not true: sometimes some presuppositions of *X* are accommodated while others are not (see also Fox (2013: fn. 35) and Francis (2019: Section 2.6.3)). While we think that Romoli's original examples could be handled by a tweak to the A-based theory, we will display new examples that fully vindicate his conclusion.

3.2.1 Romoli's argument and its limitations

Romoli (2011) starts from the examples in (29), where the boxed constituent gives rise to accommodation of the presupposition of *stop*, but not of the presuppositions triggered by *being upset* and by *too*. The more complex example in (29b) shows that the purported (non-accommodated) presuppositions really do project like presuppositions out of an *if*-clause.

(29) Romoli's examples (Romoli 2011):

a. Either John stopped being upset that he left the country too or John started being upset that he left the country too.
b. If either [John stopped being upset that he left the country too] or [John started being upset that he left the country too], he will let us know soon.

We believe that Romoli considers insertion of A at the points shown in (30a), where his objection to A is entirely valid: By locally accommodating the presupposition of *stop*, one would be forced to accommodate the presuppositions of the more embedded triggers as

[9] As a reviewer observes, certain accounts of soft presupposition triggers such as *take out* propose that the "presupposition" of soft triggers arises from competition against a set of alternatives (Abusch 2010, Romoli 2012). In Romoli (2012), this is implemented using an exhaustification operator O. Taking this view, the structure of the antecedent clause in our examples could be "O [not [… take out …]]." With this structure, O would not need to be present in the ellipsis site, because the operator O responsible for projection is outside of negation. Even if O is present in the ellipsis site, results from Chatain and Schlenker (2025a) show that O, if it exists, does not obey parallelism conditions. Either way, lack of parallelism in accommodation would be predicted. We think this is an interesting option to explore and leave it to future research to determine whether it could extend to cases of partial and intermediate accommodation to be presented in Section 3.2.2 and Section 4.2.3.

well. But Romoli's objection does not work against the modified analysis in (30b), where A is applied directly to *stop* rather than to the entire VP. This does require an extended definition of A so that it can apply to any constituent whose type ends in *t*, rather than just to propositions. But it is routine to define such an operation.[10] The present dialectic is summarized in (31).

(30) a. If either A [John stopped being upset that he left the country too] or A [John started being upset that he left the country too], he will let us know soon.
b. If either [John [A stopped] being upset that he left the country too] or [John [A started] being upset that he left the country too], he will let us know soon.

(31) **Romoli's argument and its limitations**

a. In (29), one derives (i) a presupposition that John left the country and that another salient person did too, but (ii) no presupposition that John used to be upset about this fact.
b. On the assumption that A is "all or nothing," it is unclear how to give it scope so that it could cancel only the conflicting presuppositions.
c. This conclusion is valid for the logical form in (30a), but not for the logical form in (30b).
d. The latter requires either (i) that lexical presuppositions can fail to be generated, or (ii) a generalized definition of A.

3.2.2 Vindicating Romoli's conclusion: partial accommodation

We will now seek to vindicate Romoli's conclusion in a different way, namely by displaying cases in which one and the same word gives rise to some but not all of its presuppositions—a phenomenon we term *partial accommodation*. To show this, we use the French factive trigger *s'apercevoir* (to notice), already used in Section 3.1. In the negative sentence in (32a), the verb triggers the inference that the person referred to is unpopular, and it also triggers the inference that this person is alive. Related facts hold in (32b), which involves universal projection under *none*.

(32) a. *Cette personnalité ne s'aperçoit pas qu'elle est impopulaire.*
this public.figure NE SE-notices not that-she is unpopular
'This public figure does not realize that they are unpopular.'
⇒ this person is alive
⇒ this person is unpopular.

[10] The semantic value **A** of the cross-categorial operator A can be defined as follows. For any type-theoretic object E whose type ends in t and which requires n arguments of types $\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n$ to yield a truth value, $\mathbf{A}E = \lambda d_1^{\tau_1} \ldots \lambda d_n^{\tau_n}$. 1 iff $E(d_1^{\tau_1}) \ldots (d_n^{\tau_n}) = 1$; 0 otherwise.

b. *Aucune de ces dix personnalités ne s'aperçoit qu'elle est*
none of these ten public.figures NE SE-notices that-she is
impopulaire.
unpopular
'None of these ten public figures realize that they are unpopular.'
⇒ each of these ten public figures is alive
⇒ each of these ten public figures is unpopular.

The observation is that, in local accommodation, it is possible for only one of the two presuppositions to be locally accommodated, as seen in (33)–(34), while the other one projects.

(33) a. *Cette personnalité ne s'aperçoit pas qu'elle est impopulaire, car*
this public.figure NE SE-notices not that-she is unpopular because
elle est morte!
she is dead
'This public figure does not realize that they are unpopular because they are dead!'

b. *Cette personnalité ne s'aperçoit pas qu'elle est impopulaire, car*
this public.figure NE SE-notices not that-she is unpopular because
elle ne l'est pas!
she NE it-is not
'This public figure does not realize that they are unpopular because they are not!'

(34) a. *Aucune de ces dix personnalités ne s'aperçoit qu'elle est*
none of these ten public.figures NE SE-notices that-she is
impopulaire, car elles sont toutes mortes!
unpopular because they-are all dead
'None of these ten public figures realize that they are unpopular, because they are all dead.'
⇏ each of these ten public figures is alive
⇒ each of these ten public figures is unpopular.

b. *Aucune de ces dix personnalités ne s'aperçoit qu'elle est*
none of these ten public.figures NE SE-notices that she-is
impopulaire, car aucune ne l'est!
unpopular because none NE it-is
'None of these ten public figures realize that they are unpopular, because none of them is!'
⇒ each of these ten public figures is alive
⇏ each of these ten public figures is unpopular.

It is clear that none of the insertion points for A displayed in (35) (for (34)) will be able to distinguish between the two presuppositions. The heart of the matter is that the verb *notice* simultaneously triggers a presupposition about its subject and about the embedded proposition, as stated in (36) (where we greatly simplify the lexical contribution of *notice*). Any occurrence of A that applies above *notice* will fail to draw the necessary distinction.

(35) a. [no public-figure] $\lambda x.[t_x$ [*A* notices that *x* is unpopular]]
b. [no public-figure] $\lambda x.[t_x$ *A*[notices that *x* is unpopular]]
c. [no public-figure] $\lambda x.A[t_x$ notices that *x* is unpopular]
d. [no public-figure] $A\lambda x.[t_x$ *A*[notices that *x* is unpopular]]

(36) $[\![\text{notice } F]\!]^{c,s,t,w} = \lambda d_e.\begin{cases} \# & \text{iff } d \text{ is not alive at } t \text{ in } w \text{ or } [\![F]\!]^{c,s,t,w} \neq 1; \\ 1 & \text{iff notice}'_{t,w}(\lambda t' \lambda w'.[\![F]\!]^{c,s,t',w'})(d) = 1. \end{cases}$

Proponents of A are thus forced to complicate their analysis significantly. First, they might need some syntactic representation of the two presuppositions, for instance by decomposing *notice* into two parts, one that triggers a presupposition about subject existence and the other about the truth of the propositional object. This could be implemented by invoking a voice head *v* (e.g. Kratzer 1996), responsible for the subject existence presupposition, while the lexical verb is responsible for the factive presupposition, with an LF akin to (37a) for the accommodation-free case. Depending on how one defines the cross-categorial meaning of A, this might make it possible to apply A to *v* only, as in (37b), and to *notice* or to the VP only, as in (37c) and (37d).

(37) a. t_x *v* notice that *x* is unpopular
b. t_x [*A v*] [notice that *x* is unpopular]
c. t_x *v* [[*A* notice] that *x* is unpopular]
d. t_x *v A*[notice that *x* is unpopular]

But this measure won't suffice to handle further cases, such as (38), where the relevant presuppositions pertain to the object of the verb.

(38) a. Josh won't return the book to the library.
⇒ The book is with Josh.
⇒ The book belongs to the library.
b. Josh won't return the book to the library, because he never had the book.
⇏ The book is with Josh.
⇒ The book belongs to the library.

c. Josh won't return the book to the library, because it's not a book from the library.
⇒ The book is with Josh.
⇏ The book belongs to the library.

In addition, combining our two arguments, the decompositional view of "notice" sketched above makes incorrect predictions about ellipsis: it leads to the expectation that partial accommodation is subject to parallelism requirements, but it is not, as shown in the French examples in (39).

(39) *A: Dans mon pays, le roi ne s'aperçoit pas qu'il est*
A: in my country the king NE himself-notices not that-he is
impopulaire.
unpopular
'In my country, the king does not notice that he is unpopular.'

a. *B: Dans le mien aussi: il est mort.*
B: in the mine too he is dead
'In mine too: he is dead.'
⇒ the king in A's country is alive
⇒ the king in A's country is unpopular
⇏ the king in B's country is alive
⇒ the king in B's country is or was unpopular.

b. *B: Dans le mien aussi: notre roi est très populaire.*
B: in the mine too our king is very popular
'In mine too: our king is very popular.'
⇒ the king in A's country is alive
⇒ the king in A's country is unpopular
⇒ the king in B's country is alive
⇏ the king in B's country is or was unpopular.

We conclude that Romoli's conclusion was right: accommodation isn't all-or-nothing. This dovetails with our ellipsis-based argument against the syntactic reality of A: positing A will not help in these cases.

3.3 Summary

In sum, we have provided two arguments against the A operator posited in the literature: one based on a general ellipsis test for operators, and one targeting more specifically the semantics of the A operator. We now turn to potential objections to the first or both of these arguments.

4 Possible objections

This section responds to two objections that our first ellipsis argument may raise (the main example is repeated in (40)). The first objection maintains that parallelism is in fact met in cases like (40) and A is indeed present in both clauses; the appearance of non-parallelism is due to additional pragmatic inferences. A second objection denies that our examples involve presupposition triggering at all.

(40) *Context:* We're supposed to take the lab rat out of its cage once a day. Otherwise, it feels stressed. Bill has been unreliable in performing this task.

Ann: Last Monday, Bill did not take the lab rat out of its cage.
(⇝ last Monday, the rat was initially in its cage)

Sue: On Wednesday as well, but that's just because I took it home on Tuesday and forgot to bring it back, so it wasn't in the cage at all that day.

4.1 Parallelism despite appearances

As suggested by a reviewer, one could object that Ann's utterance in (40) is in fact parsed with a local accommodation operator in the scope of negation (in essence, *not A [Bill took the rat out of its cage]*). On this view, Ann's utterance means that either (a) the rat was in the cage and Bill did not take it out of the cage on Monday, or (b) the rat was not in the cage on Monday. If the hearer has no reason to believe that (b) is the case, then they would conclude (a), giving the illusion of projection while maintaining parallelism.

To note, this objection targets our analysis but could be applied more generally to criticize the very idea of presupposition projection. In general, in a context $C[\ldots]$ where a presupposition trigger $\underline{pp}'$ is used, the reading in which the presupposition projects and is accommodated (in operator terms, it could be written $A[C(\underline{pp}')]$) is stronger than the reading where the presupposition is locally accommodated (that is, $C[A(\underline{pp}')]$). On some theories, this is even a provable property of presupposition projection.[11] This implies that any appearance of projection can always be argued to be the result of pragmatic strengthening of a locally accommodated reading, which is weaker.

For instance, the inference in (41a) could derive not from universal presupposition projection, but from a locally accommodated reading in (41b), followed by some unspecified pragmatic strengthening. Whether this is a plausible analysis depends on whether we can independently evidence the necessary pragmatic strengthening mechanism.

[11] Specifically, on some theories that are provably near-equivalent to Heim (1983), such as Schlenker (2009), presupposition projection is obtained by adding certain pragmatic conditions to the bivalent (presupposition-free) meaning of a sentence. The latter is obtained by locally accommodating all presuppositions. On these theories, the meaning of a sentence S with global projection is thus always stronger than the meaning of S with local accommodation.

(41) a. Most journalists stopped smoking.
⇒ All smoked before.
b. Most journalists [smoked before and stopped smoking].

Besides the fact that this objection targets the very idea of presupposition projection, there are two specific considerations that make it implausible in our case. First, we can offer a control that paraphrases the effect of the A operator using a conjunction, as in (42). But unlike (40), it does not seem possible in this case to infer from Ann's utterance that the rat was initially in the cage. This casts doubt on the assumption that hearers can rule out (b) purely on pragmatic grounds, as required by the suggested counter-analysis.[12]

(42) *Context:* We're supposed to take the lab rat out of its cage once a day. Otherwise, it feels stressed. Bill has been unreliable in performing this task.
Ann: Last Monday, it wasn't the case that the rat was in the cage and that Bill took it out.
(⇏ last Monday, the rat was initially in its cage)
Sue: On Wednesday as well, but that's just because I took it home on Tuesday and forgot to bring it back, so it wasn't in the cage at all that day.

Second, local accommodation is usually taken as a last-resort operation (Heim 1983). So we have to wonder why this parse of Ann's utterance should be licensed here, especially since the alternative parse without the A operator conveys the same information without relying on pragmatic reasoning. The need to satisfy parallelism with Sue's utterance is the only plausible explanation for why it might be preferred. But Ann's utterance is made without knowledge that Sue's utterance will contain an elided constituent. In the absence of any incentive for a parse with the A operator, the parse without the A operator is likely the one intended by Ann. In Appendix C, we discuss a more sophisticated version of the reviewer's proposal, assuming that Sue is "re-parsing" Ann's utterance, and show that the parsing freedom it affords may make incorrect predictions in other examples.

In addition, even if reparsing were available in limited circumstances, it is only plausible in the context of dialogues, where one character may misinterpret or pretend to misinterpret another character's utterance. Since some of our examples, such as (28),

[12] As is standard in presupposition studies, it is very difficult to find entirely minimal non-presuppositional controls of presupposition triggers. Starting from a presupposition trigger $\underline{p}p'$ (triggering a presupposition $\underline{p}$), we might want to compare it to a conjunction *p and* p' (or *p and* $\underline{p}p'$), where the presupposition is locally satisfied. But the conjunction comes with a pragmatic requirement of its own, according to which p should be non-trivial (anti-presupposed). This problem affects our point as well.

do not involve dialogues, an approach in terms of pragmatic strengthening of a locally accommodated reading would be needed there, even though, as we saw, the necessary pragmatic strengthening cannot be evidenced in (42).

To summarize, for the objection to hold, we require two regimes of explanation, each tailored to a specific case: in dialogues, where it is implausible that the first character intends a parse with A, it must be assumed that the second character is allowed to reparse; in discourse, it must be assumed that a pragmatic strengthening occurs with the same net effect as projection, even though this strengthening cannot be independently evidenced from conjunctive paraphrases. The conclusion that local accommodation is not subject to parallelism appears, by contrast, much simpler.

4.2 Accommodation vs. non-triggering

There is a second objection which applies to both the ellipsis cases and the partial accommodation cases. Instead of claiming that a presupposition is triggered and then locally accommodated, it could be assumed that no presupposition was triggered in the first place. So the structure of our ellipsis example would be as in (43), with no A operator in either clause. The absence of observed projection in Sue's utterance would be a consequence of non-triggering.

(43) Ann: Last Monday, Bill did not take the lab rat out of its cage.
Sue: On Wednesday as well, <~~Bill did not take the lab rat out of its cage~~>.

Similarly, for cases of partial accommodation, one would argue that these are cases in which the relevant presupposition is not triggered. On this view, these cases do not involve partial accommodation but partial non-triggering.

(44) Josh won't return the book to the library, because he never had the book.
$\not\Rightarrow$ The book is with Josh.
$\Rightarrow$ The book belongs to the library.

The possibility of non-generation of presuppositions on pragmatic grounds has a long history, going back at least to Stalnaker (1974). It has acquired new relevance in view of numerous recent proposals that argue that some or all presuppositions are generated by a productive algorithm working on top of bivalent, non-presuppositional meanings, making the latter primitive (e.g. Abusch 2010, Abrusán 2011, Tonhauser et al. 2013, Schlenker 2021, Roberts and Simons 2024). If any of our examples involves non-triggering, they make our argument moot. In fact, if non-triggering exists, some may even argue that there is no need for local accommodation and thus for a local accommodation operator. If local accommodation operators do not exist, our argument

is moot, so we place ourselves in the more intricate situation where both non-triggering and local accommodation exist.

To this, we offer two responses. The first response builds on an argument of Homer (2008) that non-triggering and accommodation can be told apart because they differ in whether they intervene for NPI licensing; this argument in particular entails that both notions are needed. Homer isolates a French presupposition trigger that is not liable to non-triggering. Lest one rejects Homer's conclusions, we provide a second argument that non-triggering cannot explain our ellipsis examples. The argument relies on intermediate accommodation: cases in which a presupposition is undoubtedly triggered because it projects to an entire constituent, but is still accommodated in an intermediate context. Since intermediate accommodation is notoriously difficult to obtain empirically, the data are more subtle and we can only hope to show that, *to the extent that intermediate accommodation is possible,* it gives rise to the expected inferential patterns in our examples.

4.2.1 Homer's diagnostic for non-triggering

Homer (2008) offers a possible criterion to distinguish between local accommodation and non-triggering. The criterion stems from an analysis of presuppositional intervention in the licensing of negative polarity items (NPIs). Homer starts by noting that presupposition triggers intervene and may prevent an NPI from being licensed. He then notes that this intervention effect persists even when the presupposition is locally accommodated (contrary to what one might expect on a simple-minded theory). Crucially, however, there are constructions in which intervention by a presupposition trigger disappears, and he proposes that these cases should be viewed as involving non-triggering rather than local accommodation.

A particularly minimal case involves the factive presupposition trigger *s'apercevoir* ("to notice") introduced in Section 3.1. In downward-entailing environments, the complement may occur in both the indicative (*s'apercevoir*+IND) and the subjunctive (*s'apercevoir*+SUBJ). As shown in (45), *s'apercevoir*+IND intervenes in the licensing of the NPI *la moindre chance* ("even the slightest chance"). This is so even when its factive inference does not project.

(45) **Pierre ne s'aperçoit pas que Marie a la moindre chance,*
Pierre NE SE-perceives not that Marie has.IND the slightest chance
car elle n'a aucune chance.
because she NE-has no chance
'Pierre does not realize that Marie has any chance, because she has no chance.'
(Homer 2008)

But when the embedded clause is in the subjunctive (*s'apercevoir*+SUBJ), no intervention makes itself felt, as in (46) (using the NPI *quoi que ce soit* "anything").

(46) *Si Pierre s'apercevait que Marie ait changé quoi que ce soit, il*
if Pierre SE-perceived that Marie have.SUBJ changed anything he
serait en colère.
would.be in anger
'If Pierre found out that Marie changed anything, he would be mad.' (Homer 2008)

Homer argues that the contrast makes sense if *s'apercevoir*+SUBJ involves genuine non-triggering of the factive inference in (46). He posits that *s'apercevoir*+IND does not have the option of non-triggering: it must be locally accommodated, causing an intervention effect, as observed in (45).

This analysis is independently corroborated by the difference in projection behavior between *s'apercevoir*+IND and *s'apercevoir*+SUBJ. With *s'apercevoir*+IND and absent any other pressure, the factive inference that Marie has chances projects. The variant in (47a) without the NPI and without the *because*-clause does yield the inference that Marie has chances. Only the addition of the *because*-clause forces a non-projected reading, as in (47b). This dovetails with the typical view that local accommodation is a last resort (Heim 1983).

(47) a. *Pierre ne s'aperçoit pas que Marie a des chances.*
Pierre NE SE-perceives not that Marie has.IND some chances
'Pierre does not realize that Marie has chances.'
⇒ Marie has chances.

b. *Pierre ne s'aperçoit pas que Marie a des chances, car*
Pierre NE SE-perceives not that Marie has.IND some chances because
elle n'en a aucune.
she NE-of.them has none
'Pierre does not realize that Marie has chances, because she has none.'
⇏ Marie has chances.

By contrast, the subjunctive (which, under Homer's view, always yields non-triggering) does not typically project. (48a) does not give rise to the inference that Marie changed things, and the same observation might extend to (48b), with an embedded clause in the subjunctive, which contrasts with (48c), with an embedded clause in the indicative.

(48) a. *Si Pierre s'apercevait que Marie ait changé des choses, il*
if Pierre SE-perceived that Marie have.SUBJ changed some things he
serait en colère.
would.be in anger
'If Pierre found out that Marie changed something, he would be mad.'
⇏ Marie changed things.

b. *Pierre ne s'est pas aperçu que Marie ait changé des*
Pierre NE SE-is not perceived that Marie have.SUBJ changed some
choses.
things
'Pierre did not realize that Marie had changed things.'
⇏? Marie changed things.

c. *Pierre ne s'est pas aperçu que Marie a changé des*
Pierre NE SE-is not perceived that Marie has.IND changed some
choses.
things
'Pierre did not realize that Marie had changed things.'
⇒ Marie changed things.

Why in this particular case the subjunctive induces obligatory non-triggering is a further question; for the present argument, all that matters is that it does.

4.2.2 Ruling out non-triggering

Using *s'apercevoir*+IND, we can ensure that at least some of our examples must involve local accommodation. *s'apercevoir*+IND is in fact precisely the construction we investigated for a variant of our ellipsis examples in (27) and for our partial-accommodation examples in (33) and (34).

To make the point sharper, we note that *s'apercevoir*+IND still induces intervention effects in our examples even when adding an NPI to the target sentences, as in (49) and (50). This results in an intervention effect and thus strongly suggests that the phenomenon we are assessing in (27) is indeed local accommodation rather than non-triggering: we do obtain NPI intervention in this case, which would not be the case if non-triggering were at stake.

(49) *Context:* The students at the private high school have no chance of success.
Au lycée privé, les élèves ne s'aperçoivent pas qu'ils
at.the high.school private the students NE SE-notice not that-they
ont
have
'At the private high school, the students do not realize that they have'

a. *de réelles chances, …*
some real chances, …
'some real chances,'
b. **la moindre chance, …*
the slightest chance, …
'the slightest chance,'

(50) *…parce qu'ils n'en ont aucune.*
…because they NE-of.them have none
'because they don't have any.'

Likewise, minimal variants of our original French partial-accommodation cases, repeated in (51a) and (52a), with NPI *le moindre* trigger intervention, are shown in (51b) and (52b). This is as expected from the *s'apercevoir*+IND construction. These sentences are less acceptable than the NPI-free versions in (51a) and (52a), but also less acceptable than the NPI-full but factive-free examples in (51c) and (52c).

(51) a. *Cette personnalité ne s'aperçoit pas qu'elle a du soutien,*
this public.figure NE SE-notices not that-she has some support
car elle n'en a pas!
because she NE-of.it has not
'This public figure does not realize that she has some support, because she does not have any!'
⇒ this public figure is alive
⇏ this public figure enjoys some support.
b. **Cette personnalité politique ne s'aperçoit pas que ses mémoires*
this public.figure political NE SE-notices not that her memoirs
aient la moindre valeur littéraire, parce qu'ils n'en ont
have.SUBJ the slightest value literary because they NE-of.it have
aucune!
none
Intended: 'This public figure does not notice that her memoirs have the slightest literary value, because they have none!'
c. *Cette personnalité politique ne pense pas que ses mémoires aient*
this public.figure political NE thinks not that her memoirs have.SUBJ
la moindre valeur littéraire, parce qu'ils n'en ont aucune!
the slightest value literary because they NE-of.it have none
'This public figure does not think that her memoirs have the slightest literary value, because they have none!'

(52) a. *Aucune de ces dix personnalités ne s'aperçoit qu'elle a du*
none of these ten public.figures NE SE-notices that-she has some
soutien, car aucune n'en a.
support because none NE-of.it has
'None of these ten public figures realize that she has some support, because none of them has any!'
⇒ each of these ten public figures is alive
⇏ each of these ten public figures enjoys some support.

b. **Aucune de ces dix personnalités ne s'aperçoit que ses mémoires*
none of these ten public.figures NE SE-notices that her memoirs
aient la moindre valeur littéraire, parce que leurs mémoires
have.SUBJ the slightest value literary because that their memoirs
n'en ont aucune.
NE-of.it have none
Intended: 'None of these ten public figures notices that their memoirs have the slightest literary value, because they have none!'

c. *Aucune de ces dix personnalités ne pense que ses mémoires*
none of these ten public.figures NE thinks that her memoirs
aient la moindre valeur littéraire, parce que leurs mémoires
have.SUBJ the slightest value literary because that their memoirs
n'en ont aucune.
NE-of.it have none
'None of these ten public figures thinks that their memoirs have the slightest literary value, because they have none!'

4.2.3 Intermediate accommodation and ellipsis

Our second argument against the non-triggering analysis of our examples involves intermediate accommodation.[13] While intermediate accommodation is notoriously

[13] In Section 4.2.1, we used Homer's diagnostic to exclude the possibility that apparent cases of partial accommodation are in fact due to non-triggering of the relevant presupposition. In principle, we could construct a new argument to the same effect using intermediate accommodation. The logic would be that part of the presupposition fully projects (thus excluding the possibility that non-triggering is involved), while another part is accommodated at an intermediate scope. We tried to construct such examples, as in (i) (where ellipsis is just intended to make the sentence easier to process). The idea was that the factive presupposition of *feel angry* fully projects (hence the purported inference that B's company's interns were underpaid), while that of *continue* is accommodated at an intermediate level: if it fully projected, there would be an inference that B's company's interns used to feel angry; this inference would also arise if there were non-triggering or local accommodation. Indeed, in that case, the reading could be written in informal logical notation as *impossible [not [feel angry and continue to be]]*, which is equivalent to *necessary [feel angry and continue to be]*. Owing to the difficulty of intermediate accommodation itself, we could not get clear judgments, either in favor of or against our contention. We therefore leave this possibility open for future research.

complex, it has the advantage of not being amenable to an analysis in terms of non-triggering. Schematically, we will consider examples that have the form in (53), where *think-not* corresponds to the verb *doubt/don't think*, and where the bracketed part is elided.

(53) *X* think-not if *p*p', *q*. *Y* too <~~think-not if *p*p', *q*~~>.

Simplifying somewhat[14], there are three patterns of accommodation, which can be paraphrased (with conjunctions) as in (54). All possible patterns yield substantially different readings, which can be teased apart. Critically, intermediate accommodation is the only reading entailed by *Y thinks not p*.

(54) **Possible patterns of accommodation in the elided clause**

a. **Global accommodation:**
[*p* and *Y* thinks that *p*] and *Y* think-not if *p*$'$, then *q*.
b. **Local accommodation:**
Y think-not if [*p* and *p*$'$], *q*.
c. **Intermediate accommodation:**
Y think-not [*p* and if *p*$'$, *q*].

Consider (55). We aim for a non-parallel reading where the antecedent clause uttered by person A does not involve any accommodation whereas the elided clause uttered by person B involves intermediate accommodation, as schematically represented in (54c). Because of the difficulty of judgments surrounding intermediate accommodation, we include a control without ellipsis in (55c). If a parallelism condition makes itself felt on ellipsis, only the unelided control in (55c) should allow for a non-parallel reading and thus be felicitous (with intermediate accommodation in the elided clause but not in the antecedent clause). For our consultants, both the target elided sentence and the unelided control allow such a reading, confirming that intermediate accommodation is not subject to parallelism.

(i) A: In my company, it's impossible/inconceivable that the interns won't **continue** to **feel angry** that they are underpaid.
B: In mine as well – for here they never did.
Purported judgments (unclear):
⇒ A's company's interns were underpaid; ⇒ A's company's interns have felt angry that they were underpaid
⇒ B's company's interns were underpaid; ⇏ B's company's interns have felt angry that they were underpaid.

[14] We disregard issues related to the Proviso Problem; see for instance Geurts (1996, 1999), Lassiter (2012), Mandelkern (2016).

(55) a. A: I doubt that the Statue of Liberty would collapse if an earthquake shook its pillars.
b. B: I do too, but that's because I know that the Statue of Liberty does not have pillars.
c. B': I too doubt that the Statue of Liberty would collapse if an earthquake shook its pillars, but that's because the Statue of Liberty does not have pillars.

On the operator-based theory, the representation of the elided clause would have to contain A under *think-not*, as represented in (56). The syntactic parallelism condition would require that it should be present in the antecedent too, thus predicting intermediate accommodation in the antecedent clause.

(56) *X* think-not A not $\underline{p}p'$. *Y* too <think-not A not $\underline{p}p'$>.

As discussed for local accommodation in Section 3.1, one might wish to propose a counter-analysis of this example. One could assume that intermediate accommodation does take place in A's utterance, leading to the meaning: *I believe that either the Statue of Liberty does not have pillars or that it does and it would not collapse if an earthquake shook its pillars*. One would then have to assume that pragmatic considerations could lead hearers to conclude A in fact believes the second disjunct. The same arguments developed in Section 3.1 suggest that this counter-analysis is untenable. First, A's utterance is made before B's, so there is no reason A should intend an otherwise marked intermediate-accommodation parse when a parse without it is both closer to the meaning she wishes to convey and unmarked. Second, controls with explicit coordination fail to provide evidence for the suggested pragmatic reasoning:

(57) I doubt that the Statue of Liberty has pillars and would collapse if an earthquake shook its pillars.

4.2.4 Summary and outlook

In this section, we responded to two potential objections to our arguments. The first objection affirms that local accommodation is subject to the parallelism requirement despite appearances, but locally accommodated readings may be pragmatically strengthened to become indistinguishable from projected readings. We find that the pragmatic strengthening in question cannot be independently evidenced and is dubious to posit for the dialogue examples that we have.

The second potential objection is that the cases of local accommodation we discussed should be reanalyzed as non-triggering instead. We first repeated Homer's argument that the two phenomena may be distinguished in French and showed

that our ellipsis tests applies equally well to the construction argued to involve local accommodation. The objection is further refuted by the existence of cases of intermediate accommodation in which the operator-based theory once again makes incorrect predictions for ellipsis resolution.

5 An account in terms of Free Enrichment

The empirical evidence laid out in Section 3 establishes two properties of local accommodation: first, that local accommodation is not subject to parallelism requirements in ellipsis; second, that local accommodation may be partial. These properties are unexpected if local accommodation is obtained by an operator with the semantics of Bochvar's A. This section sketches a different approach to local accommodation that does not rely on covert operators. To motivate our approach, it will be instructive to first consider how one could alter the semantics of the A operator to predict the two properties of local accommodation that we have evidenced.

As discussed in Section 2, an approach to local pragmatic effects in terms of operators can explain an apparent lack of parallelism by assuming a context-sensitive semantics for the operator. When a constituent has a context-sensitive semantics (for instance, contains a pronoun), it may yield sloppy readings in ellipsis. Applying this approach to our examples, we could assume, schematically, the structure in (58). In these structures, the operator A is present in both the antecedent clause and the elided one and depends on a variable bound by the time adverbial. Furthermore, the semantics of the A operator, which we do not try to specify explicitly here, would be such that, in this context, A denotes the identity function when its index variable is saturated with *Monday*, effectively making A vacuous, and denotes Bochvar's **A** when saturated with *Wednesday*, resulting in local accommodation.

(58) Ann's utterance: Last Monday, *x* Bill did not A_x take the lab rat out of its cage.
Sue's utterance: This Wednesday too, *y* <~~Bill did not A_y take the lab rat out of its cage~~>.
$[\![A_{\text{Monday}} S]\!] = [\![S]\!]$ (identity function).
$[\![A_{\text{Wednesday}} S]\!] = \mathbf{A}([\![S]\!])$.

For this strategy to work, it must furthermore be assumed that the A operator is inserted even when local accommodation is not intended, as in Ann's utterance. For partial accommodation (the case repeated in (60)), the operator approach would require the assumption that A's index variable determines not simply whether the semantics of A is vacuous or not, but exactly how much it accommodates. This is sketched in (59): a

contextual parameter G serves to define a conjunct $G(x)$, which filters some but not all of the presuppositions of (60).

(59) not [A_x Josh return the book to the library]
$^{G}[\![A_x S]\!] = G(x)$ & [15] $^{G}[\![S]\!]$.

(60) Josh won't return the book to the library, because he never had the book.
$\not\Rightarrow$ The book is with Josh.
$\Rightarrow$ The book belongs to the library.

To summarize, the operator-based approach can meet the challenges raised by our examples, provided it assumes an omnipresent operator A whose semantics can depend on any and every contextual parameter. While this approach might be empirically successful, the omnipresence of A and its maximal context-sensitivity suggest that this operator is in fact spelling out a mechanism of composition.

Our proposal explores precisely this alternative: local accommodation is obtained by a compositional mechanism. This mechanism, much like the A given above, can give rise to local accommodation effects or not, partially or completely. Our approach takes inspiration from the *meaning modulation* idea put forth by Recanati (2010) (already introduced in Section 1.1), as well as similar ideas in Sperber and Wilson (1986) and Carston (2002)): the idea that context may alter the meaning of constituents in the course of composition. Meaning modulation has been proposed to explain various linguistic phenomena, from implicit domain restrictions and contextual restrictions on events to non-literal uses of language and local scalar implicatures[16]. In our analysis, we focus on *enrichment*[17], mechanisms by which a meaning can be restricted to a more specific interpretation.

Meaning modulation (just as the revised operator approach sketched above) relies heavily on unanalyzed contextually provided meanings. It therefore raises questions about constraints on these expressive meanings, an issue we discuss in Section 5.2.2.

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[15] In our metalanguage, & is a Strong Kleene conjunction: $A \& B = 0$ iff either A or B is 0, = 1 iff both are 1, and # otherwise.

[16] For skepticism about whether modulation is the best explanation of some of these phenomena, see Feinmann (2020).

[17] The Free Enrichment mechanism was conceived of as a form of generalized domain restrictions in a previous incarnation of this work. The main issue with this is that domain restrictions in the NP appear rather freely, whereas cases of local accommodation need proper contextual support: by default, presuppositions project globally. Here, we leave open what connection if any exist between the two mechanisms. At one extreme, it could be that these are two entirely separate mechanisms for restricting predicates applying under different conditions and at different levels: one (Free Enrichment) is a compositional rule pragmatically licensed by the need to meet presuppositions without creating contradictions, the other (domain restrictions) is obtained by syntactically represented domain variables as in e.g. von Fintel (1994). At the other extreme, a more parsimonious would view quantifier domain as a subspecies of our generalized restrictions procedure and try to unify the licensing conditions of local accommodation with licensing conditions of covert domain restrictions.

5.1 Proposal: Free Enrichment

We formalize *Free Enrichment* in the form of new rules of composition, defined in (61–63). In essence, these rules redefine composition by reference to an auxiliary interpretation function ${}^{G}[\![\cdot]\!]^{c,s,t,w}$. This interpretation function affects elementary predicative expressions[18] by narrowing down their extensions to those elements that satisfy a certain generalized restriction. Crucially, this may affect nominal and verbal expressions alike. In greater detail, (62a) states that *G* restricts the meaning of elementary predicative expressions, while (62b) states that *G* has no effect on other elementary expressions. Finally, (63) ensures that composition rules (function application, predicate modification, and predicate abstraction) are redefined so as to take into account the effect of *G* on the meanings they combine.

(61) **Assumption.** For any $n \geq 1$, any context c determines a generalized restriction R^n_c, which can take an assignment function, a time, and a world as additional arguments. $R^n_{c,s,t,w}$ takes an n-ary relation and n individual arguments and yields a truth value.
Notation: For $n = 1$, we write $R_{c,s,t,w}$ instead of $R^n_{c,s,t,w}$.

(62) For any elementary expression a, context c, assignment function s, time t, and world w:

a. If $[\![a]\!]^{c,s,t,w}$ has a predicative type (e.g. $\langle et\rangle$, $\langle e\langle et\rangle\rangle$ and $\langle e\langle e\langle et\rangle\rangle\rangle$) and requires n arguments of type e to yield a truth value, then ${}^{G}[\![a]\!]^{c,s,t,w} = \lambda d_1 \ldots \lambda d_n.\, R^n_{c,s,t,w}([\![a]\!]^{c,s,t,w}, d_1, \ldots, d_n)\ \&\ [\![a]\!]^{c,s,t,w}(d_1, \ldots, d_n)$.
b. Otherwise, ${}^{G}[\![a]\!]^{c,s,t,w} = [\![a]\!]^{c,s,t,w}$.

(63) For any expressions a, b, context c, assignment function s, time t, and world w:

a. **Function application.**
If one of $\{a, b\}$ has type $\langle \alpha, \beta\rangle$ and the other has type α, then $[\![[ab]]\!]^{c,s,t,w}$ is ${}^{G}[\![a]\!]^{c,s,t,w}({}^{G}[\![b]\!]^{c,s,t,w})$ or ${}^{G}[\![b]\!]^{c,s,t,w}({}^{G}[\![a]\!]^{c,s,t,w})$, whichever is type-theoretically acceptable.
b. **Predicate modification.**
If a and b are both of type $\langle e, t\rangle$, then $[\![[ab]]\!]^{c,s,t,w} = \lambda x_e.\ {}^{G}[\![a]\!]^{c,s,t,w}(x)\ \&\ {}^{G}[\![b]\!]^{c,s,t,w}(x)$.
c. **Predicate abstraction.**
If $E = such_i$, who_i, $which_i$, i, or λ_i, then $[\![[EF]]\!]^{c,s,t,w} = \lambda x_e.\ {}^{G}[\![F]\!]^{c,s[i\to x],t,w}$.

[18] One could explore a version of our system with restrictions applying to all expressions whose type 'ends in t'.

We illustrate our proposal with weather reports (Recanati 2010). Depending on context, (64a) may be read as having an indefinite location, while (64b) has a definite location. Recanati argues that both interpretations are obtained by a form of enrichment, rather than via covert locative expressions.

(64) It is raining.
  a. *it's raining somewhere on Earth*
  b. *it's raining in Paris*

In our formalization, (64) composes as in (65) (introducing event semantics only to illustrate the example). *rain*, expressing a predicate meaning, can be restricted to either those events that happen somewhere on Earth or events that happen in Paris. Each restriction yields one of the readings highlighted by Recanati.

(65) $[\![\exists[\text{rain}]]\!]^{c,s,t,w} = {}^{G}[\![\exists]\!]^{c,s,t,w}({}^{G}[\![\text{rain}]\!]^{c,s,t,w})$
$= {}^{G}[\![\exists]\!]^{c,s,t,w}(\lambda e_v.\, R_{c,s,t,w}(\text{rain}'_{t,w}, e) \,\&\, \text{rain}'_{w}(e))$
$= \exists e.\, R_{c,s,t,w}(\text{rain}'_{t,w}, e) \,\&\, \text{rain}'_{w}(e).$

  a. (64a): $R_{c,s,t,w}(\text{rain}'_{t,w}, e) = 1$ iff $\exists l[\text{LOC}(e) = l \wedge \text{on-earth}'(l)]$.
  b. (64b): $R_{c,s,t,w}(\text{rain}'_{t,w}, e) = 1$ iff $\text{LOC}(e) = \text{Paris}$.

This is a mere illustration of the mechanism of Free Enrichment. As we will now see, this rule can also serve as a model for local accommodation.

5.2 Free enrichment and local accommodation

We start by illustrating how Free Enrichment can be used to perform local accommodation. The idea is that, in some cases, a restriction on the verbal predicate can be used to satisfy a presupposition triggered by that predicate. We illustrate the key mechanism on the example in (66a), which has the schematic structure in (66b) (with *X* representing *on Wednesday*, $\underline{pp}'$ representing *Bill took the lab rat out of the cage*, and *i* representing the trace left by the time adverbial).

(66) a. On Wednesday, Bill did not take the lab rat out of the cage, but that's because the lab rat wasn't in the cage to begin with.
  b. $X\ \lambda i.$ not $i\ \underline{pp}'$.

The derivation of the meaning of the λ-abstract proceeds as in (67), making use of the rules in (62–63). We note that *G* plays a non-trivial role only when it is applied to predicative elements. For notational simplicity, we write $\underline{pp}'_{t,w}$ for $[\![\underline{pp}']\!]^{c,s[i\mapsto x],t,w}$ (which does not depend on the assignment function or on the context).

(67) $[\![\lambda i.\ \text{not}\ i\ \underline{pp'}]\!]^{c,s,t,w} = \lambda x_e.\ {}^{G}[\![\text{not}\ i\ \underline{pp'}]\!]^{c,s[i\mapsto x],t,w}$
$= \lambda x_e.\ \text{not}'({}^{G}[\![\underline{pp'}]\!]^{c,s[i\mapsto x],t,w}(x))$
$= \lambda x_e.\ \text{not}'(R_{c,s[i\mapsto x],t,w}(\underline{pp'}_{t,w}, x)\ \&\ \underline{pp'}_{t,w}(x))$.

If we feed this λ-abstract its argument corresponding to X, which we write as $\mathbf{X}$, we obtain the result in (68).

(68) $[\![\lambda i.\ \text{not}\ i\ \underline{pp'}]\!]^{c,s,t,w}(\mathbf{X}) = \text{not}'[R_{c,s[i\mapsto \mathbf{X}],t,w}(\underline{pp'}_{t,w}, \mathbf{X})\ \&\ \underline{pp'}_{t,w}(\mathbf{X})]$.

Note that in this case, we do not need the enrichment to depend on assignment functions because $\underline{pp'}$ is predicative and so the value of R may depend on the argument of the predicate, which differs across the two clauses. But the dependency on assignments is needed to deal with the more complex cases of quantifier domain restrictions in e.g. (24), as seen in Section 2.4.

Since we take the enrichment to be contextually determined, it is natural that the context can be adjusted to ensure that $R_{c,s[i\mapsto x],t,w}(\underline{pp'}_{t,w}, \mathbf{X})$ entails (by generalized entailment) the presupposition $\underline{p}$ of the elided predicate $\underline{pp'}$. This yields, in essence, the same result as local accommodation.

Let us now see how this account can predict non-parallelism in ellipsis. We consider B's answer in (69a), with the representation in (69b).

(69) a. A: On Monday, Bill did not take the lab rat out of the cage.
B: On Wednesday too, <~~Bill did not take the lab rat out of the cage~~>.
b. $Y\ \lambda i.\ \text{not}\ i\ \underline{pp'}.\ X\ \lambda i.\ \text{not}\ i\ \underline{pp'}$.

We already derived the meaning of the elided clause '$X\lambda i.\ \text{not}\ i\ \underline{pp'}$' in (68). By parity of reasoning, the meaning we get for the antecedent is:

(70) $[\![\lambda i.\ \text{not}\ i\ \underline{pp'}]\!]^{c,s,t,w}(\mathbf{Y}) = \text{not}'[R_{c,s[i\mapsto \mathbf{Y}],t,w}(\underline{pp'}_{t,w}, \mathbf{Y})\ \&\ \underline{pp'}_{t,w}(\mathbf{Y})]$.

The key is that the restriction R depends on the value of the argument of the predicate. The antecedent clause and the elided clause are evaluated with different values for the argument: X for the latter and Y for the former. For this reason, the value of R in both cases can differ: in the elided clause, R is a predicate strong enough to meet a restriction; in the antecedent, R is weaker, allowing the presupposition to project.

While they have different denotations, the two clauses remain semantically parallel. The focus value of the sentence containing the elided constituent (assuming *on Wednesday* is F-marked) is as in (71a), which simplifies to (71b), using (70). The meaning

of the sentence containing the antecedent clause belongs to this focus value and so semantic parallelism is met.

(71) a. $\{[\![\lambda i.\ \text{not}\ i\ \underline{pp}']\!]^{c,s,t,w}(\mathbf{Z}) \mid \mathbf{Z} \in D_e\}$.
b. $\{\text{not}'[R_{c,s[i\to\mathbf{Z}],t,w}(\underline{pp}'_{t,w}, \mathbf{Z}) \,\&\, \underline{pp}'_{t,w}(\mathbf{Z})] \mid \mathbf{Z} \in D_e\}$.

The elided clause and the antecedent are also syntactically parallel. Ellipsis is thus correctly predicted to be licensed, even though local accommodation is performed in only one of the two clauses. Our account therefore avoids the problem raised for Bochvar's A operator account of local accommodation.

5.2.1 Extending Free Enrichment to partial accommodation

The mechanism of Free Enrichment can also solve Romoli's problem and explain partial accommodation. Since accommodation is now a pragmatic process in which one modulates a meaning in order to satisfy a presupposition, nothing prevents the adjustment from targeting some presuppositions but not others: Those that cannot project without yielding a pragmatic failure will be accommodated; others need not be.

To be concrete, consider again the example of partial accommodation in (32a), with the (A-free) logical form in (72).

(72) not [this public figure] $\lambda x.\ t_x$[notices that x is unpopular].

Writing *VP* for the embedded verb phrase (so *VP* = "notices that x is unpopular"), its restricted meaning will be computed as in (73) relative to a context c, an assignment function s', a time t, and a world w (but it should be borne in mind that, if the entire sentence is evaluated relative to c, s, w, the relevant values of s' will be of the form $s' = s[x \to d]$, for d different public figures).

(73) ${}^{G}[\![\text{VP}]\!]^{c,s',t,w} = \lambda d.\ R_{c,s',t,w}([\![\text{VP}]\!]^{c,s',t,w}, d) \,\&\, [\![\text{VP}]\!]^{c,s',t,w}(d)$.

With a trivial generalized restriction, projection will give rise to a requirement that, at the world and time of evaluation (that is, at the world and time of the context, if the sentence is not embedded[19]), the subject public figure is (i) unpopular and (ii) alive[20]. If the "alive" inference cannot be accommodated globally because this would contradict the rest of the sentence, as in (33a), one can assume that, for d = the subject public figure, $R_{c,s[x\to d],t,w}([\![\text{VP}]\!]^{c,s[x\to d],t,w}, d)$ guarantees that d is alive in w. The "alive" presupposition

[19] We assume, as is standard, that if F is uttered in context c and s properly represents the referential intentions in c for the free variables of F, then F is true in c iff $[\![F]\!]^{c,s,c_t,c_w} = 1$, where c_t and c_w are respectively the time and world coordinates of c.

[20] We distinguish these in our discussion, but we do not have to assume that these are morpho-syntactically distinct at the lexical level: *notice* will come with failure conditions that take into account all presuppositions at once.

of the VP will thus be locally satisfied without yielding undesirable inferences about the world of evaluation. On the assumption that the restriction contributed by *R* is minimal, we preserve the inference that the subject public figure is unpopular. In the case of (33b), things are reversed: it is the presupposition that the subject public figure is unpopular that is accommodated by way of a non-trivial *R*, whereas the presupposition that the subject public figure is alive is preserved.

The foregoing discussion pertained to a VP (namely *notices that x is unpopular*) found under a λ-abstractor, and thus the same account extends to the quantified examples in (34), which can uniformly be given the logical form in (74), without the operator A.

(74) [no public-figure] $\lambda x.\ t_x$[notices that *x* is unpopular].

Theory-neutrally, partial accommodation of the "alive" presupposition predicts the same behavior as in (75a), while partial accommodation of the "unpopular" presupposition should be similar to (75b).

(75) a. [None of these public figures]$_x$ is **alive** and notices that they$_x$ are unpopular.
⇒ all of these public figures are alive.
b. [None of these public figures]$_x$ is **unpopular** and notices that they$_x$ are unpopular.
⇒ all of these public figures are unpopular.

Two remarks should be added for clarity. First, one may worry that if (75a) and (75b) are adequate paraphrases of (34a) and (34b) respectively, then the meaning contributed by the first conjunct, "is alive" or "is unpopular," would be made redundant or vacuous by the end of the sentence, namely *because they are all dead* or *because they are not popular*. And indeed, if all the public figures are dead, then for any *p* it follows that *no public figure is alive and p*. However, the *because*-clause asserting that all the public figures are dead comes after the quantified statement, and thus the boldfaced conjunct in (75a) need not be redundant in its local context; it is redundancy in a local context that normally gives rise to deviance. The same remarks apply to (75b) in the context of (34).

Second, several theories of presupposition projection (notably, various incarnations of dynamic semantics following Heim (1983)) predict a conditional presupposition, both in (34) and in our analysis of partial accommodation. For instance, partial accommodation of the "unpopular" presupposition in (74) (corresponding to (52b)), as well as the conjunctive equivalent in (75b), are predicted to presuppose merely that, for each relevant public figure *x*, if *x* is unpopular, then *x* is alive. This is too weak, but it is an instance of the more general Proviso Problem: in diverse cases, traditional accounts

of presuppositions predict conditional presuppositions when unconditional ones are observed (see for instance Geurts 1996, 1999, Lassiter 2012, Mandelkern 2016). This question is orthogonal to the issue of accommodation per se, as shown by the fact that it arises in (75) just as it does in our target examples in (34). We thus leave this issue aside in what follows.

5.2.2 Constraining Free Enrichment

As a final remark, we should note that Free Enrichment is a powerful mechanism. In principle, there is no bound on how restrictive the value of *G* can be, and it may apply to both nominal and verbal elements. By itself, this need not be a problem: we assume that *G* is determined by context and thus by pragmatic rules. For example, typical local accommodation readings like (76) rely on a principle of Contradiction Avoidance: local accommodation avoids a projected reading that would contradict the speaker's follow-up.

(76) The king of Syldavia did not come, because Syldavia has no king.

But, as noted by Feinmann (2020), Contradiction Avoidance is insufficient. Feinmann notes that (77a) appears contradictory under any reading. If Free Enrichment were freely available for the purpose of avoiding contradiction, it is puzzling why (77b) should not be a possible reading of the sentence.

(77) a. # When I'm upset, I cry, but when I'm upset, I don't cry.
b. When I'm terribly upset, I cry, but when I'm only mildly upset, I don't cry.

We leave this problem for future research. We simply note that it is a general one, as it extends to the contextually provided restrictions of weather verbs (which we presented to illustrate Free Enrichment in Section 5.1). For instance, (78a) cannot be restricted to mean (78b) even to avoid contradictions.

(78) a. When it rains, I cry, but when it rains, I don't cry.
b. When it rains in Lyon, I cry, but when it rains in Paris, I don't cry.

6 Conclusion

We conclude that the accommodation operator A is not syntactically real. Its effects are better analyzed by way of an operator-free pragmatic process, namely a form of Free Enrichment. Free Enrichment explains why, under ellipsis, differences seen in terms of local accommodation between an elided expression and its overt antecedent

mirror those independently found with nominal domain restrictions and other context-dependent expressions. It also solves an independent problem noted by Romoli: contrary to what A-based theories predict, accommodation isn't all-or-nothing. We leave some important questions for future research. As discussed in Section 5.2.2, Free Enrichment as stated is rather unconstrained but, in actual fact, it is not available for use in any utterance, even when its use could save a sentence from contradiction. It is left open here what constraints govern its use.

Appendix A Post-semantic Enrichments and Ellipsis

Besides the mechanisms of syntactic and contextual enrichment, discussed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, discrepancies between the meaning delivered by composition and the observed interpretation may be due to pragmatic processes, such as reasoning based on world knowledge, reasoning about communicative intentions, and so on—all instances of *post-semantic enrichment*. By their nature, post-semantic enrichments should not be subject to semantic parallelism requirements, which only compare forms and *literal meanings*.

Conversational implicatures. In (79), a famous example by Grice, a conversational implicature is triggered: B implicates that Smith has, or may have, a girlfriend in New York. Grice noted that nothing in the overt or covert form of B's utterance conveys this inference as part of its meaning. Correspondingly, one expects that a sentence that copies the boxed VP by way of ellipsis, as in (80), need not give rise to the same implicature. This is what we observe: the elided VP does not give rise to the inference that Smith's sister has been paying a lot of visits to New York because she has a partner there (one may understand that she has been paying a lot of visits to New York because of her brother, for instance, but this is certainly optional).

(79) A: Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days.
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately.
(Grice 1975: p. 51)

(80) B: His sister has too – but not for the same reason.

Strengthened anti-presuppositions. A principle called Maximize Presupposition has been posited in recent research to explain why an expression such as *believe* gives rise to an inference that its complement is false. According to this principle, *believe* may only be used if its presuppositional alternative *know* is inapplicable because its presupposition is not met (e.g. Sauerland 2008, Percus 2006, Singh 2011, Schlenker

2012, Spector and Sudo 2017, Anvari 2018); the corresponding inference is sometimes called an anti-presupposition. The principle predicts that a use of *believe* triggers an inference to the effect that the presupposition of *know* does not hold (an *anti-presupposition*). But as Chemla (2008) notes, this inference is often insufficiently strong, as illustrated in (81) (where "common belief" refers to the epistemic status of standard presuppositions).

(81) John believes that I have a sister.

a. Alternative: John knows that I have a sister.
b. Actual inference: The speaker does not have a sister.
c. Predicted inference: It is not common belief that the speaker has a sister. (Chemla 2008)

Chemla (2008) proposes a reasoning-based mechanism of strengthening: by combining (81c) with independently plausible principles of epistemic logic, one gets, in some desirable cases, the stronger inference in (81b).

If this analysis is correct, the stronger inference is a post-semantic enrichment. One expects, just as above, that the stronger inference could be invisible to the parallelism requirement. A VP copied through ellipsis might thus not need to be strengthened when its antecedent is. This is what we observe in (82): while A's utterance conveys that A does not have a boyfriend, B's utterance (on a bound-variable reading) yields no such inference. By contrast, when the inference is made part of the literal meaning using the adverb *wrongly*, as in (83), the inference is preserved, with the result that B's reply sounds contradictory.

(82) A: I am under the impression that my landlord believes I have a boyfriend.
B: I am too – but unlike yours, my landlord is right!

(83) A: I am under the impression that my landlord wrongly believes I have a boyfriend.
B: #I am too – but unlike yours, my landlord is right!

In sum, we have seen two cases where post-semantic enrichments fail to be "seen" by parallelism requirements on ellipsis, for reasons that follow from reasoning-based analyses. Crucially, these enrichments are relatively uncontroversial because they are applied globally (to an entire utterance) by reasoning about the speaker's belief state. It is unclear how such mechanisms could apply in the scope of various operators, and this makes them *prima facie* implausible candidates for an analysis of local and intermediate accommodation.

Appendix B Adding Material in the Elided Expression?

In the main text, parallelism conditions on ellipsis allowed us to construct arguments against operator-based views of accommodation and non-redundancy. These conditions rule out structures with the schematic form in (84).

(84) *X* [...]. *Y* [... Op ...].

Still, one may counter that ellipsis does not require strict semantic identity. It may be that ellipsis allows the antecedent and the elided clause to contain different pieces of meaning, so long as sufficiently many pieces are similar.

The first case that comes to mind is that of the apparent deletion of features (and possibly further elements) in the course of ellipsis resolution. An example is given in (85a). If John identifies as male and Mary identifies as female, (85a) has a bound reading but (85b) does not. Descriptively, the masculine feature of *himself* can be disregarded by ellipsis resolution, although the noun *man* cannot be. One theory, among others, is that features can be deleted under identity with those of a binder[21] (e.g. von Stechow 2003; see also Jacobson 2012, Sauerland 2013, Esipova 2019).

(85) a. John admires ~~him~~self, but Mary doesn't.
b. John admires the man he has become, but Mary doesn't.

But the ability to disregard parts of the antecedent will not help in (84), where material has been *added* to the elided clause.

More relevant is the case of sprouting, illustrated in (86), where elided material appears within angle brackets. It argues for a looser formulation of identity conditions because the elided clause contains the trace of an adjunct (marked by *t*) that lacks a correlate in the antecedent clause.

(86) a. [He painted the wall] but I don't know in what color <~~he painted the wall~~ ~~*t*~~>.
b. [She left] but I don't know when <~~she left~~ ~~at *t*~~>.

For present purposes, the question is whether such looser parallelism conditions would make the elided clause sufficiently parallel to its antecedent despite the difference with respect to the presence of *Op*. This would fundamentally undermine the argument we

[21] Alternatively, it could be that ellipsis allows *himself* in the antecedent (85a) to count as parallel to *herself* in the ellipsis site. The two words differ only in their presuppositions, and identity of assertive content might be sufficient for the parallelism conditions to be satisfied. Even if this view is correct, our main claim about accommodation and non-redundancy is unaffected because our target sentences should, under the operator theory, have different assertive contents.

developed in the main text. To put it in a slogan, are our target cases instances of "covert operator sprouting"?

There are several disanalogies that make the objection weak, however. First, none of the cases considered involved sluicing or questions. We are not aware of cases of sprouting outside such environments. Second, the looser parallelism conditions proposed in the literature to deal with sprouting do not seem liberal enough to license our cases either. We illustrate with Kotek and Barros (2019)'s proposal. For them, ellipsis is licensed when the union of the members of the focus value of the antecedent is identical to the union of (the members of) the focus value of the consequent. For (86b), the union of the focus of the antecedent appears in (87a) and that of the consequent appears in (87b). Under the assumption that everyone who leaves does so at some point or other, they are indeed identical.

(87) a. $\bigcup [\![\text{she left}]\!]^f = \bigcup \{\lambda w.\ \text{she left in } w\} = \lambda w.\ \text{she left in } w.$
b. $\bigcup [\![\text{she left at } t_F]\!]^f = \bigcup \{\lambda w.\ \text{she left at } t' \text{ in } w \mid t' \text{ a moment}\} = \lambda w.$ she left at some point in w.

This type of parallelism does not hold in our cases. Take, as an illustration, (88) (repeated from (27) now in an English version). Under a syntactic analysis, we assume the structure in (89).

(88) At my public school, the students don't realize that they have real chances of success.
At my private school as well – but that's because the students are so bad that they don't have or stand a chance.

(89) At my private school <the students don't Op realize that …>.

The focus values are schematically given in (90). We write *chance(s)* for the proposition "the students at school *s* have real chances of success" and *realize(s)* for the proposition "the students at *s* believe that they have chances at *s*" (or whatever the assertion corresponding to *realize* is). Because of the presupposition in the antecedent clause, it is unclear what the union of (90b) ought to be: must the presuppositions of all propositions in the set be satisfied (= (90d)), or is it sufficient that one of them is (= (90c))? Whichever choice is made, the resulting proposition is not equivalent to its elided counterpart, due to the semantic contribution of the A operator; as per Kotek and Barros's parallelism conditions, ellipsis should not be licensed.

(90) a. $\bigcup[\![[\text{at my private school}]_F, \ldots]\!]^f = \bigcup\{\lambda w.\neg \mathbf{A}([\![\text{realize that } \ldots]\!]^w(s)) \mid \text{school}_w(s)\} = \lambda w.[\exists s : \text{school}_w(s)]\neg[\text{chance}_w(s) \wedge \text{realize}_w(s)]$.

b. $\bigcup[\![[\text{at my public school}]_F, \ldots]\!]^f = \bigcup\{\lambda w.\neg([\![\text{realize that } \ldots]\!]^w(s)) \mid \text{school}_w(s)\} = \bigcup\{\lambda w : \text{chance}_w(s).\neg\text{realize}_w(s) \mid \text{school}_w(s)\}$.

c. $=?\ \lambda w : [\exists s : \text{school}_w(s)]\text{chance}_w(s).\ [\exists s : \text{school}_w(s)]\text{chance}_w(s) \wedge \neg\text{realize}_w(s)$.

d. $=?\ \lambda w.([\forall s : \text{school}_w(s)]\text{chance}_w(s)).\ ([\exists s : \text{school}_w(s)]\text{chance}_w(s) \wedge \neg\text{realize}_w(s))$.

In conclusion, the looser parallelism conditions needed for sprouting do not seem to threaten our argument. More generally, we do not know of any independently motivated parallelism conditions loose enough to allow for parallelism between a clause with an accommodation/non-redundancy operator and one without.

Appendix C Against Reparsing

An anonymous reviewer offers a more sophisticated defense of the operator-based view for our example (26), repeated below as (91).

(91) *Context:* We're supposed to take the lab rat out of its cage once a day. Otherwise, it feels stressed. Bill has been unreliable in performing this task.

Ann: Last Monday, Bill did not take the lab rat out of its cage.
(⇝ last Monday, the rat was initially in its cage)

Sue: On Wednesday as well, but that's just because I took it home on Tuesday and forgot to bring it back, so it wasn't in the cage at all that day.

The proposal is that, just as we argue, Ann does not intend her utterance to be parsed with an operator A. However, Sue, in an effort to meet the parallelism requirement of ellipsis, decides to "reparse" Ann's utterance by adding the A operator. As the reviewer notes, this process of reparsing leads to a weaker meaning, still compatible with the proposition Ann intended to convey. The reviewer also assumes that, by pragmatic considerations, the parse with A may be strengthened to have the same meaning as Ann's original statement.

In Section 3.1, we already argued against the idea that pragmatic reasoning may make the A parse as strong as the A-free parse with projection. We will now argue that reparsing is not an option in ellipsis. The example in (92) is a case in point.[22]

[22] Due to availability constraints, these judgments were not provided by the two native speakers who provided most of the original judgments in this paper, but by another native speaker.

(92) *Context:* Museums are closed on Tuesdays. Speakers A and B reminisce about their trip to Europe some thirty years ago.

Ann: We were in France only on Tuesday. When we were in Paris, we didn't visit a museum.

Sue: When we were in London too. But we visited it on our trip the year after.

We exploit the fact that, in English, negation can scope above or below indefinites. The scope *not* ≫ *a museum* leads to a stronger reading than the scope *a museum* ≫ *not*. We are thus faced with one strong parse and one weak parse, just as in (91). Ann's discourse makes it likely that she intends the strong parse, corresponding to the scope *not* ≫ *a museum*. If reparsing were an option, Sue could intend her elided constituent to have a weak parse, corresponding to the scope *a museum* ≫ *not*. This, in turn, would make Sue's use of *it* in her second sentence coherent, as *it* can be anaphorically related to a wide-scope existential quantifier in this case. But our consultant does not judge such an interpretation to be available; instead, our consultant interprets Sue as saying that Ann and her group didn't visit any museum in London, and struggles with the subsequent pronoun. In sum, reparsing does not seem to be an option for scope. This makes it very unlikely that it is an option for A-insertion.

Since our example in (91) does not require any miscommunication, we conclude that reparsing cannot explain it.

Appendix D Ellipsis or not?

A second point of contention with (40) is whether our examples truly involve ellipsis. Indeed, some authors have argued that stripping may be a kind of null pronoun, although this null-pronoun view has also been challenged (see Hankamer and Sag 1976; Fiengo and May 1994 and works cited in Johnson 2018). For the purpose of testing the presence of the A operator, the distinction between ellipsis and anaphora is immaterial as long as both require strict semantic parallelism with their antecedent. More specifically, our argument just depends on the fact that the locally accommodated meaning in (93a) cannot count as parallel to the non-accommodated meaning in (93b).

(93) **Schematic forms:**

a. Not A ($\underline{p}p'$).
b. Not $\underline{p}p'$.

A reviewer proposes that the difference matters because parallelism constraints on anaphora might be looser than those on ellipsis. One possibility is that a propositional

pronoun may denote any proposition *entailed* by its antecedent. A variant is that a propositional pronoun may denote any proposition that carries the same assertive content as its antecedent (in technical terms, any proposition that is Strawson-equivalent to the antecedent, cf von Fintel 1999).

In fact, however, for present purposes parallelism requirements on stripping are as stringent as those on ellipsis. (94a) shows that mere entailment is not sufficient (as on the propositional-pronoun theory above): we infer that in her new job Mary satisfies the very same property, namely *working in southern France*, as in her old job, rather than merely a property entailed by it (such as *working in France*). If the weaker requirement were in force, the continuation (*she works in downtown Paris*) would be felicitous, contrary to fact. In (94b), a propositional pronoun attempts to refer to the proposition *Mary believes that her boss would never give her a raise*, which has the same assertive content but presupposes less than the antecedent proposition *Mary knows that …*. A continuation is added to ensure that this putative reading is the only one felicitous. Despite this, the sentence feels contradictory, proving that anaphora requires strict semantic parallelism. Thus, even if stripping were a case of propositional anaphora, it would still be a test for the presence of A.

(94) a. In her previous job, Mary worked in southern France. In her new job as well (#in fact, she works in downtown Paris).
⇒ in her new job, Mary works in southern France (rather than merely in France).

b. #In her previous job, Mary knew that her boss would never give her a raise. In her new job as well, but she's mistaken: the boss is in fact planning to give her a raise.

Lest there be remaining worries regarding our use of stripping to make our point, we construct related (but more complex) examples with VP-ellipsis. In VP-ellipsis, the view that treats VP-ellipsis as a form of anaphora resolution has less currency (see the discussion in Merchant (2019)). As before, we need negation to be elided in our example, so as to be sure that the putative A operator will be part of the elided constituent. To do so, we embed the negation through the cumbersome phrase *this was a day when …*, as in (95).[23]

(95) *Context:* We're supposed to take the lab rat out of its cage once a day. Otherwise, it feels stressed. Bill has been unreliable in performing this task.
[Pointing towards a calendar]

[23] Due to availability constraints, this example was checked with a different speaker than the other examples in this article.

A: This [pointing towards Monday] was a day when Bill did not take the lab rat out of the cage.
B: That [pointing towards Tuesday] was too, but there I had taken the rat with me the day before, so it wasn't in the cage at all.

While complex, this construction behaves like the stripping case we discussed in (26); both constructions converge on the conclusion that there is no parallelism requirement on local accommodation.

Competing interests

The authors have no competing interests to declare.

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
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